Abstract: Even though there is an ineluctable abyss between Analytic and Continental Philosophy, it is not hard to argue that in his later works Ludwig Wittgenstein draws a closer philosophical attitude to the latter in terms of that the notions developed by him, such as language-games, family resemblances, meaning-in-use or rule-following, apart from his earlier nomological approach to language, leave room for various understandings and uncertainty in language. In the present work, my primary task is to concentrate on the close relationship between the Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances and Gadamer's idea of the fusion of horizons.
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"We find that connects all the cases of comparing is a vast number of overlapping similarities, and as soon as we see this, we feel no longer compelled to say that there must be some one feature to them all. What ties the ship to the wharf is a rope, and the rope consists of fibres, but it does not get its strength from any fibre which runs through it from one end to the other, but from the fact that there is a vast number of fibres overlapping." (BrB 192).
Why A Comparison of Wittgenstein and Gadamer?

Wittgenstein Practices Hermeneutics
Before we compare and contrast the concepts of language-games and horizons, let me explain why it is needed for such a philosophical study.
Wittgenstein, in his works after Tractatus period, dramatically draws near to Gadamer's ideas on linguisticality shown in the last three parts of Truth and Method. In this context, we see Wittgenstein eliminates his earlier thought on language. As it is known, in Tractatus, he declares in seven propositions language undoubtedly represents the reality. Succinctly put, language pictures reality. This argument, which became the core of the entire Analytic and positivist traditions in a short time, will be criticized by himself in his lecture notes in Cambridge. Wittgenstein here builds a radically new philosophy that will reach the peak with his posthumous work Philosophical Investigations (von Wright, 2001: 13) .
In this new philosophy, Wittgenstein realizes that the picture theory, which is the main argument of Tractatus, is insufficient to explain the nature of language since language includes not only names which can be defined ostensively, but also expressions such as "that" or "there" and different concepts like numbers and colors. Here Wittgenstein offers the notion of "language-games" in order to understand the complex structure of language.
1 By doing so, Wittgenstein introduces not a new doctrine or analytic explanations, but a method of thought (PI 109, 126 How to Read Wittgenstein's Later Works with Gadamerian Ontological Hermeneutics phrase his arguments. Even the event that he found the idea of "languagegames" is from his daily observation (Malcolm, 2001: 55 (Lawn, 2006: xiii) .
From what has been discussed so far, although it is impossible to consider Wittgenstein as a hermeneutician, we may say that while dealing with language in use and daily life in his later works, he noticeably practices hermeneutics.
There are Many Similarities between Wittgenstein and Gadamer
Besides that both philosophers give primacy to language in his works, the concepts used by Wittgenstein and Gadamer also share some genstein disagree with the idea of private language over his main example of pain, Gadamer makes an analogy between play and language in terms of that play is more than the actions of players. For Gadamer language presupposes solidarity (Lawn, 2006: 106) . In a conversation, he also indicates he agrees with Wittgenstein's argument, "no private language" (Gadamer, 2001: 56) . Furthermore, there are also similarities in between
Wittgenstein's ideas of "language in use" and "meaning in context" and the notion of "tradition" rehabilitated by Gadamer; and between the former's "language-games" and the latter's "horizon".
Gadamer Reads Wittgenstein's Works
Despite the fact that Gadamer overlooks Wittgenstein in his early works, then he admits "language-games" is very similar to his concept of prejudice. In "Foreword to the Second Edition" of Truth and Method, he says, "Wittgenstein's concept of "language games" seemed quite natural to me when I came across it" (Gadamer, 2013: xxxii, 13n) . He also mentions Wittgenstein's language games of our daily language in order to elucidate his concept of play (Gadamer, 2013: 582 valid ways of seeing. Furthermore, and more significantly, both of them stress that the rules of a language game are discovered only by observing its concrete use in interpersonal communication (Linge, 1976: xxxv) .
Hermeneutical Approach Requires to Reconcile These Two Philosophers
The aim of this paper is to search for a harmony between Wittgenstein's family resemblances and Gadamer's notion of the fusion of horizons. Hence we believe that the present work must be suitable for the purpose of a hermeneutical task. As it can be predicted, that is not to say will be a complete fusion of these two different thoughts. Rather being aware of the ground on which they stand, we will try to understand the former's works in accompany with the latter's ontological hermeneutics because we know that "a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's alterity" (Gadamer, 2013: 282) .
Wittgenstein: Language-Games and Family Resemblances
Philosophical Investigations famously starts with the critique of Augustinian picture of language, which argues, first, all words are names; second, learning a name is being told what it means; and third, learning a language is a matter of learning new words (Cavell, 2000: 24) . As Wittgenstein formulates,
In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Each word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands (PI 1; cf. BrB 179).
Here Wittgenstein raises the focal question: Learning nouns like " Augustine is entirely wrong in his approaches on language that consists of a system of signs. But rather, Augustine's attempt is not sufficient to explain our language in use (Cf. Allison, 1978: 95) . In other words, explanations based upon ostensive definitions (like what "slab" means) cannot be suitable for every case. We can point at a book while saying its name, but we cannot point at its color regardless of the thing itself. That's why
Wittgenstein seeks an exit door from ostensive or demonstrative explanations, drawn by Augustine's theory of representation in language, in favor of an expanded language including numerals, color samples, pronouns, and so on (BrB 182-3; PI 6, 8; McGinn, 2013: 45) .
For Wittgenstein, the process of learning language is not an explanation but a kind of training (PI 5). He calls this various ways of training as "language-games":
In instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone. -And there will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher -both of these being processes resembling language.
And the process of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and actions into which it is woven, the "language-game" (PI 7).
Wittgenstein here claims that rather than grasping the whole meaning of a word or a concept since it is impossible to reach certainty or purity in language, 3 a child witnesses different use of words precisely because even ostensive definitions are variously interpreted in every case (PI 28, 29, 97) . 4 As well as he learns different language-games, he becomes the master of language because these games allow him to see its different meanings in daily language and to encounter the network of similarities (PI 66; cf. BrB 184-5). The child names things, he pronounces it, and repeats after his teacher. But when we want him to differ the shape of a thing from its color, or the number of items from items themselves, "we mean something different" in that case. Wittgenstein says,
[If] we look for two such characteristic mental acts as meaning the color and meaning the shape, etc., we aren't able to find any, or at least none which must always accompany pointing to color, pointing to shape, respectively. . To put it briefly, "meaning has to do with the effectively practiced language game, i.e., the use of language in the context of a given empirical situation, where use is governed by systems of rules and conventional operations" (Allison, 1978: 97) . This polysemy of meaning is in fact the gist of language-games. That the meaning of a word changes in each circumstance brings forth the network of similarities.
That is to say, although meaning depends upon its use, each use resembles one another. Wittgenstein says,
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -but that they are related to one another in many ways (PI 65).
In this regard, the web of similarities between language-games that we use in our daily language, is called "family resemblances": "For the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way." (PI 67; cf. PI 130).
To give an example, for we learn a game like chess, we are supposed to have already known what a game is, that the rule means in a game, and so on. We have already known something. Wittgenstein, however, never addresses only one way of learning of a game. We may watch a game and repeat it step-by-step. Or, the teacher tells us what each pieces work for, and we immediately compare it with checkers or go, and then we begin to play. Further, we just watch a game, and we can play without any explanation (BB 87-8). The point is that not only does Wittgenstein point out the obscure nature of language, he also shows us that when we learn something new, it is not exactly new for us (PI 89). We are familiar with it in virtue of that it does inevitably resemble to one of our preconceived ideas -though we are not able to rule over them.
The concept of family resemblance is indeed the ultimate response of Wittgenstein towards Augustine's oversimplification of the complex structure of language and towards the problem of universals which evidently subject to the endless craving for generality. However, he refrains from offering a single essence or model for all general concepts. Instead 
Gadamer: Tradition, Prejudices, and the Fusion of Horizons
In his magnum opus Truth and Method, Gadamer proposes an awareness of the historical consciousness as opposed to the obsession with objectivity and purity in language. That means we, beings thrown in the middle of time, are unavoidably situated by our own historicity, and the dialogue between us and tradition is ineluctable. That's why, according to Gadamer, tradition is not a thing we can get rid of (Gadamer, 2001: 45) .
Rather it constitutes our prejudices, our situation in history, and consequently our historical reality of being. No one can, therefore, speak of being objective while he lives along with tradition and his prejudices.
Here Gadamer follows Heidegger's ontology. The historical situatedness of the individual (Dasein), is properly known as "historicity".
Dasein, according to Heidegger, is the being who belong to history (Heidegger, 2008: 27; cf. Gadamer, 2013: 287-9 ). Since there is no room for escaping this situation, Gadamer wants us to be aware of this situatedness rather than to overcome (Horn, 2005: 21, 32, 40; Lawn, 2006: 28) .
The situation of the individual colors our historical account, that is, as Wachterhauser states, "our ability to order and make sense of our world" (Horn, 2005: 50) . That is to say, as well as Dasein is not able to be out of himself, his belonging to history constitutes, determines, and even limits his being-in-the-world. In a word, our tradition historically and linguistically shapes us. That leads us to Gadamer's idea of the rehabilita- The role of the past cannot be restricted merely to supplying the texts or events that make up the 'objects' of interpretation. As prejudice and tradition, the past also defines the ground the interpreter himself occupies when he understands (Linge, 1976: xv) .
In this regard, each experience and understanding is completely and inevitably related to the past experiences. All process of praxis is but a chain of experiences representing the finitude of human experience and limits of understanding. The process of experience, however, according to Gadamer, has not linear but circular movement. With the help of Heidegger's interpretation (Heidegger, 2008: 188-95 ), Gadamer advances the hermeneutical circle. Just as the whole text is understood with the partial anticipatory movement of fore-understanding in hermeneutical reading of a text, so the understanding of a new experience is accomplished by our relation to tradition (Gadamer, 2013: 305-6 ).
Another significant move of Gadamer is to rehabilitate the concept of prejudice. Prejudice, gained the negative connotation by the Enlightenment and historicism, is a judgment preventing us to approach a problem as it is; and is in fact the main barricade for us get rid of tradition, of all kind of authorities, and of religion (Gadamer, 2013: 284-5) . However, Gadamer embeds the term in the center of understanding. In this sense, because it cannot be thought apart from its relationship with tradition and the past, all understanding is pre-understanding and inevitably involves prejudices. That purports prejudgments constitute our basis of understanding and shape our questioning as much as our historicity and tradition color our being (Gadamer, 2013: 288-9 ).
Hereby we reach Gadamer's idea of horizons. It is clear that our historically effected consciousness comprising of our tradition and prejudices, unavoidably shapes our standpoint, the way we see the world, namely horizon. For Gadamer, the idea of horizon not only represents not only our historical situatedness and connectedness with tradition, but also emphasizes our linguisticality since language, in general terms, is the only way to communicate with people and texts. 
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The concept of "horizon" suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision that the person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand -not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion (Gadamer, 2013: 316) .
The linguistic horizon, i.e., our standpoint in language, constantly and inevitably interacts because language presupposes a solidarity. Horizons inevitably fuse in every linguistic encounter (Lawn, 2006b: 29) . This process of interaction, one's dialogue with the horizon of the past, of people, or of a text, is named by Gadamer as "the fusion of horizons".
Even though it is impossible to say this hermeneutical task can never be finally completed, horizons indispensably fuses within another horizons due to the very fact that "all understanding is always the fusion of these horizons" (Gadamer, 2013: 317) . Therefore we can argue that all understanding is a retrospective relation between the present and the past experience. As Lawn summarizes,
The language through which we articulate the present resonates with the meanings from the past and they continue to be operative in the present;
this gives a sense of what Gadamer means by "effective historical consciousness" (Lawn & Keane, 2011: 53) .
However, it is not true that one has own horizon does not mean he is stuck in his prison. Horizons are in fact open to change. That is to say, as long as prejudices we have interact with other horizons, they limit or extend the range of horizons in the linguistic base. What is more, where two horizons fuse, something constantly arises that did not exist before (Gadamer, 2001: 48; cf. 2013: 422-3) . In the next section, we will call this process unending learning. he has learned what a red thing "is".
How Do We Learn
As it is understand, it is not hard but impossible to find the beginning of learning. In this regard, we can say we are thrown at the middle of language; and in this thrownness, Wittgenstein's response to this complicated system is that we learn color concepts by recognizing resemblances between what we experienced in the past and what we are experiencing 5 Cavell suggests the leaps in language: "We don't know the meaning of the words. We look away and leap around." (Cavell, 2000: 24) . 
